Abstract-Software development teams need guidance on choosing security practices so they can develop code securely. The academic and practitioner literature on software development security practices is large, and expanding. However, published empirical evidence for security practice use in software development is limited and fragmented, making choosing appropriate practices difficult. Measurement frameworks offer a tool for collecting and comparing software engineering data. The goal of this work is to aid software practitioners in evaluating security practice use in the development process by defining and validating a measurement framework for software development security practice use and outcomes. We define the Security Practices Evaluation Framework (SP-EF), a measurement framework for software development security practices. SP-EF supports evidencebased practice selection. To enable comparison of practices across publications and projects, we define an ontology of software development security practices. We evaluate the framework and ontology on historical data and industrial projects.
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I. Introduction
Software development teams need guidance on choosing security practices so they can develop code securely. Many software development security practices have been proposed in the academic and practitioner literature. Four examples of lists of security practices from practitioners include Microsoft's Security Development Lifecycle (SDL) [1] , the Software Assurance Forum for Excellence in Code (SafeCode) 1 , Cigital's Building Security In Maturity Model (BSIMM) 2 , and the Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP) Software Security Assurance Process (SSAP) 3 In our research, we will use these lists of practices as sources of data on security practices.
While the sources listed above offer development teams assistance in recognizing valuable security practices, each team is left to research each list and decide whether to adopt a given practice. For example, both the BSIMM and SafeCode indicate that their data on security practices is descriptive, leaving empirical data on practice use and outcomes to other sources. Each practice chosen requires some investment of resources, and each practice not chosen may limit the team's ability to catch and resolve vulnerabilities in the software they develop. In the absence of evidence for whether practices are suitable for a given piece of software, application of these practices is a matter of the time, effort, and cost associated with experimentation.
Measurement frameworks offer an alternative or supplement to experimentation by enabling the collection of empirical evidence and the comparison of results across projects. Basili et al. [2] presented their experiences with defining a framework for collecting and comparing results from software engineering experiments. Williams et al. [3] defined a measurement framework for evaluating the use of Extreme Programming (XP), XP-EF. XP-EF defined 'context factors' to capture internal project-related variables, 'adherence metrics' to capture XP practice use, and 'outcome measures' to capture external project results (e.g. quality).
The goal of this work is to aid software practitioners in evaluating security practice use in the development process by defining and validating a measurement framework for software development security practice use and outcomes. We propose the Security Practice Evaluation Framework (SP-EF), a measurement framework for software development security practice use. Paralleling XP-EF, we define a set of measures for recording context factors, practice adherence, and outcome measures in the use of security practices in software development.
Early in the development of SP-EF, we recognized that the practices named in each of our sources differ and overlap in ways that make comparisons across lists of practices difficult. For example BSIMM's 'Integrate black box security tools into the QA process' practice, and SafeCode's 'Use appropriate testing tools' practice describe related, but not identical, concepts, and tools. A means for recognizing both the similarities and differences is necessary to enable comparison across data sources using either set of practice names. To enable making these comparisons, we are building an ontology, the Software Development Security Practice Ontology (SDSPO). Kitchenham et al. [4] used an ontology to define a framework for measuring maintenance activity. They observed that ontologies provide a means for classifying, understanding and replic 4 ating empirical results across studies, aid in resolution of contradictory results, and define a context in which questions can be answered. Our expected contributions include:
• The Security Practice Evaluation Framework (SP-EF), a measurement framework comprised of a set of measures and measurement protocols for measuring security practice use and outcomes in the development process.
• The Software Development Security Practice ontology (SDSPO) for reducing ambiguity in identifying and describing security practices and security outcomes in the software development process.
II. Research Questions
The research questions are as follows: RQ1: What is the appropriate ontology for a software development security practices measurement framework?
RQ2: What are the appropriate context factors, practice adherence measures, and outcome measures for a software development security practices measurement framework?
RQ3: How valid are the context factors, practice adherence measures, and outcome measures for a software development security practices measurement framework, as measured by data from software development projects?
RQ4: How reliable are the context factors, practice adherence measures, and outcome measures for a software development security practices measurement framework, as measured by data from software development projects? RQ5: Is it possible to correlate software development security practice use with security outcomes in released software?
III. Background and Related Work
In this section, we present background information on software development, and software process measurement, and software safety.
A. Security Practices in Software Development
Measuring security is difficult [3] . Vulnerabilities can have complex and varied causes. Some vulnerabilities can be traced to source code, such as improper array handling or 'buffer overflows'. Other vulnerabilities can be traced to missing design elements, such as, the absence of needed access controls in the software. Vulnerabilities can be costly to the users of software. As a consequence, vulnerability-related information is often guarded. One of the effects of this caution is that, while many companies track security defects in great detail, they often do not share their results.
The initiatives described in the introduction (BSIMM, SafeCode, Microsoft's SDL, and OWASP's SSAP) illustrate how the need to build security in has drawn the attention of the software development industry. Because both software technology and threats to software evolve over time, SP-EF must accommodate new practices from sources we have not 4 considered. If the underlying ontology has captured the necessary elements and relationships, extensions to the framework will be straightforward.
B. Software Process Measurement
Software project measurement is non-trivial [2] , [5] . While software can be measured in various ways (e.g. measures of size or complexity), managing the collection of the data can be time-consuming [2] , and interpreting the results is as much art as it is science. More problematic, linking software to the processes and people who developed it, and linking software to its outcomes in the world are not simply technical problems; they have social and political dimensions.
.Prechelt and Pepper [6] investigated why practitioners do not use what they term "Defect-Insertion Circumstance Analysis", studying reasons including lack of technique knowledge, difficulty of technique application, lack of technique usefulness, and reliability problems, concluding that low reliability in mining historical data for making process changes is a key problem. Schull et al. [7] observe that the effect of practices on defects cannot be quantified without a framework for relating defect introduction and removal rates across software phases.
Shull et al report on two examples of relating practices to defect results. Cornford et al. [8] report on a software tool, 'Defect Detection and Prevention' (DDP) used at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory that links requirements to Preventative measures, Analyses, Process Controls and Tests (PACTs), allowing evaluation of whether a project's PACTs match well with its requirements and risk tolerance. Madachy and Boehm [9] applied Orthogonal Defect Classification (ODC) to the COnstructive QUALity Model (COQUALMO) which was then applied to the development of risk advisory tools for software projects at NASA. We aim to publish comprehensive documentation for the framework and model, allowing crossorganization use of SP-EF.
C. Software Safety
Leveson [10] argues that software safety is an appropriate approach to understanding and controlling the socio-technical systems responsible for providing safe use of complex engineering products.
Systems-Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA) [10] is a hazard analysis technique based on Leveson's systems theoretic accident causality model (STAMP). STPA analysis calls for safety constraints, hierarchical safety control structures, and process models to be defined for the system under consideration.
Together these elements identify the actors (e.g. manager, developer, user), actions (e.g. training, design, compile, use), artifacts (e.g. application, network, source file), and relationships (e.g. 'developer compiles source code') involved in controlling a socio-technical system. Variations of the scheme have been applied to everything from thermostats to rocket launches to air traffic control. By conducting a STPA analysis of security practice use in software development we aim to build an ontology of software development security practice use in a systematic way.
IV. Proposed Solution
Our research plan requires two components: a framework for identifying and measuring software development security practices and outcomes, and an ontology for identifying and describing the entities measured in the framework.
A. The Security Practices Evaluation Framework
SP-EF is composed of a list of context factors, practice adherence measures, and outcome measures supporting decision-making via empirical measurement of security practice use in software development. The first iteration of the SP-EF is a survey questionnaire, capturing project context factors (e.g. team size, software size), practice adherence (e.g. 'Do you use this practice?'), and outcome measures.
Applying the framework in a project or organizational context requires the following steps:
• Compare the project's inventory of artifacts (e.g. design documents, source code, tooling) with the elements called for by the ontology. where the project and framework elements are aligned. Measure adherence as indicated by the presence of project log data mapping to framework elements.
B. The Software Development Security Practices Ontology
Relying on surveys of existing lists of practices is problematic because no single list covers every practice, each list addresses different audiences, and projects vary in ways not anticipated by generic lists. This work seeks to establish an ontology in which any given software development security practice, from training to threat modeling to buffer overflow detection, to practices not yet defined, can be measured. To develop our ontology in a systematic way, we apply software safety's STPA technique to the security practice lists identified in Section 1, to the Mozilla Firefox security team process and examples identified in a previous study [11] , and to examples from the National Vulnerability Database (NVD) 5 . We expect that the entities and relationships identified can be mapped to the security constraints, hierarchical control structures, and process models of STPA. Security constraints are supplied by standard security properties (e.g. Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability). The hierarchical safety control structures can be built up from the roles (actors, e.g. developers, system owners, users), actions (e.g. specify, compile, commit, use), and artifacts (e.g. requirements, designs, documents, source files, binaries, test suites, operations logs). Process control models combine actors, actions and artifacts, while maintaining constraints.
As an example of how ontology components are identified, Figure 2 presents a sketch of the actors, actions, entities, and relationships identified through STPA for the BSIMM Secure 'touch points' for architectural analysis (AA).
This sketch presents a low-detail view of the ontology. The full ontology captures each unique actor, action, the entities involved, and how security properties are identified and measured for each unique combination.
Given the ontology, one can ask coverage questions like:
• How is security risk evaluated for security features? For design? For the application? • How well are the security reviewers trained?
• What kinds of security features are common in designs within the organization? Adherence can be measured by identifying the degree to which a model element's implementation in a given project implements the strongest known alternative for that model element. For example, the BSIMM suggests that a consultant, one of the organization's security experts, and/or a project architect, may be the reviewer (implement the 'Security Reviewer' controller element). The BSIMM suggests that the strongest alternative is for the project architect(s) to have the required security knowledge, suggesting an ordinal scale for measuring review adherence. Through annotating project artifacts and project participant actions, we can build empirical evidence for these claims.
V. Methodology and Evaluation
Applying STPA analysis to the four security practice lists identified in Section 1 will generate the SDSPO.
Creating the SP-EF requires defining context factors, practice adherence measures, and outcome measures. Context factors will be developed by indexing the actors and artifacts identified in the SDSPO against the security metrics identified by the SMS, and against standard lists of context factors, e.g. Jones [5] . Designing questions to probe the presence of each actor, action, artifact, and relationship will generate the list of SP-EF practice measures defined in the SDSPO. Adherence measures are based on three questions about each identified practice: 'How often do you engage in this practice?', 'Rate Outcome measures are based on vulnerabilities identified in the application(s) under consideration. SDSPO will be assessed in three ways. First, SDSPO will be compared with each of its constituent sources for included and excluded elements (e.g. actors, actions, artifacts). Second, by SDSPO's support for SP-EF. We would expect every element of SDSPO to be used in defining the SP-EF measures, and we would expect that every SP-EF measure can be defined in terms of SDSPO. Exceptions to these expectations are likely indicators of problems. Third, by comparing SDSPO with data generated from application of the SP-EF to historical and industrial project data.
SP-EF will be assessed by comparing it with other theoretical and proposed models by comparing it against historical data, and by evaluation in industrial case studies.
VI. Current Progress
We have conducted a systematic mapping study (SMS) of security metrics [12] , yielding a list of processes and artifacts measured for security properties in the development process. We have extracted ontology data from the BSIMM, our SMS, and from a study of the vulnerability repair process in Firefox and phpMyAdmin [11] . The study of the vulnerability repair process collected detailed data about source code changes and security outcomes from historical data. However, examples of practice use in the historical data are anecdotal, and we expect to require more direct means for obtaining an understanding of practice use. The initial version of the SP_EF is a developer survey designed to collect data on survey practice use in projects. The survey questions are early examples of the framework measurements. The survey must be refined to provide the complete set of data called for by the ontology.
VII. Proposed Work
The first version of the SP-EF survey questionnaire revealed the limits of adopting a single list of practices, leading to the ontology development. Construction of the ontology is underway now. Beyond driving the definition and refinement of the SP-EF measures, the ontology may offer opportunities to automate collection of data from other data sources (e.g. updates to the NVD, tweets about vulnerabilities on Twitter). We will publish SP-EF and SDSPO online, to foster review and discussion.
In the course of the present work, we have identified several degrees of security practice maturity in open source projects. OpenBSD is an example of significant investment in security practices 6 . Other projects show evidence of low investment in security practices. Surveying these open source projects using SP-EF offers an opportunity to assess SP-EF's measurement of security practices using existing project data. The key work necessary for next year is to establish agreements 6 http://www.openbsd.org/security.html with software development teams to use the framework in ongoing projects and publish suitably anonymized results.
Using data from historical and industrial case studies, we will conduct analysis of the framework's validity and reliability. Results from the vulnerability repair process study suggest Categorical Data Analysis [13] may be a good fit for studying the effects of practices on outcomes.
